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Borrowing Behavior of the Proprietary
Firm: Do  Some  Risk-Averse  Expected
Utility Maximizers  Plunge?
Robert A.  Collins  and Edward E. Gbur
When a proprietor's  liability is limited, borrowing  behavior for an expected utility
maximizer may vary widely. Proprietors with little to lose may rationally  choose very
large debt levels while others may choose to finance  with 100%  equity. This article
presents a theory to explain these widely observed variations in behavior.
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An examination of a sample of farm financial
records nearly  always will reveal  some farms
that have very high levels of financial leverage.
While this could be explained by risk-seeking
behavior or a subliminal desire to commit fi-
nancial  suicide,1 it may also  be  the result of
rational  risk-averse  behavior.  Although  little
is known about financial  plunging,  it has not
been ignored in the literature.
Robison  and  Lev examined  the  effects  of
various  forms  of limited  liability and  found
that they could explain a rational incentive to
"go  for  broke"  in  these  situations.  Some  of
these points were cleverly illustrated with sports
metaphors. Ahrendsen and Collender  showed
numerical  simulations  indicating  that  risk-
averse decision makers could choose very large
debt levels under certain conditions.  Robison,
Barry, and Burghardt  examined  the effects  of
financial  stress  and limitation  of liability  on
optimal  leverage  choice.  Using a mean-vari-
ance framework,  they showed that given lim-
ited liability, the optimal debt choice increases
with an  increase  in the probability  of bank-
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' Very large debt-asset ratios may also be noted after a farm has
experienced a heavy loss of assets. Refusal  to reduce the  scale of
the farm by  selling assets and retiring debt, thereby reducing the
debt-asset ratio, amounts to a choice of high leverage. Inability to
sell assets could make it involuntary.
ruptcy.2 Their  result was  independent  of the
size of the risk aversion parameter, the interest
rate, and all other relevant parameters.  This is
a very strong conclusion.  It suggests that any
borrower maximizing a mean-variance  utility
function will wish to borrow more as the prob-
ability of bankruptcy increases. Since it is clear
that borrowing more increases the probability
of bankruptcy, if an increase in the probability
of bankruptcy  also  causes  the  proprietor  to
borrow more, it would appear that this model
suggests that all proprietors would always bor-
row as much as possible. The reason Robison,
Barry,  and  Burghardt  did  not  fall  into  this
"Catch 22"  was that they assumed that an in-
crease in debt does not increase the probability
of bankruptcy.  They assumed that the level of
income (loss) that would cause bankruptcy was
exogenously  determined.
The model presented  here has tradeoffs.  It
makes the effect of debt choice on bankruptcy
endogenous but uses a specific (although plau-
sible) utility function and density function. The
major  results,  however,  compare  favorably
with empirical observation and have been con-
firmed numerically for a variety of combina-
tions of distributions and utility functions. The
model shows that  some firms  will  choose to
finance  with  all  equity,  some  will  borrow  a
moderate  amount,  and  some  will borrow  to
2 We define bankruptcy  as negative equity. We do not consider
illiquidity problems.
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the limit,3 i.e., plunge. The optimal choice de-
pends on the farmer's aversion to risk, the cost
of borrowing,  and  parameters  of the density
function for the rate of return on assets.
The Model
The probability density function (p.d.f.) of the
rate  of return  on risky  assets  reflects  the  as-
sumption of a subjective belief that the rate of
return on farm assets has a worst possible out-
come (a), a best possible outcome (b), and any
rate of return between a and b is equally likely.
We assume the farmer believes that the worst
possible outcome will cause some loss of assets
(a < 0) but does not expect a total loss of assets.
Therefore, the worst possible rate of return on
assets must be greater than -100%  (or equiv-
alently, a > - 1). The farmer also believes that
the best possible rate of return on risky assets
exceeds the borrowing rate, k. Therefore, where
-1  < a < 0  and b  >  k  >  0,  the subjective
p.d.f.  for the rate of return on assets (R)  is:
g(R)  =  a
0,  otherwise.
In order to  make the leverage  problem  rele-
vant,  we  assume that the farmer  expects  the
rate  of return on risky farm  assets to exceed
the borrowing rate,4 E(R) = (a + b)/2 > k.
Given  initial  equity of eo,  terminal  equity
(e 1 ) 5is the sum of beginning equity and earn-
ings on farm assets less the cost of debt (D =
debt):
e, = eo  + R(D  + eo)-  kD
= e0(l  + R) + (R  - k)D.
Under  these  assumptions,  terminal  equity
(wealth) also  has  a uniform  distribution  be-
tween the equity level resulting from the worst
possible  rate of return on assets,  ea = eo(l  +
a) +  (a - k)D and the equity level  resulting
from the best possible rate of return on assets,
eb=  eo(l  + b)  + (b - k)D, with p.d.f.:
3 We are  examining  the  demand for  credit.  Lenders  may not
wish to supply all that is desired,  thus creating a "credit limit."
4 Only a  risk lover would wish to borrow if the  cost of credit
was higher than the expected rate of return on assets. We consider
only risk-averse borrowers.
5 Throughout the  article,  e is equity,  E  is the  expectation  op-





= eb-  ea  (eo  + D)(b-a)'
0,
ea  < e,  < eb
otherwise.
Since a > -1,  bankruptcy cannot occur un-
less  the  farmer  has  some  debt.  If the  worst
possible  rate  of return  on  assets  is  realized,
terminal equity  will be e0(l  +  a) > 0 if there
is no debt, but increases in debt move the lower
limit of the p.d.f. to the left at the rate of (a -
k) per unit of D. Terminal equity equals  zero
if the worst possible rate of return on assets is
realized when D = e0(l  +  a)/(k - a) = D* and
becomes  negative  as  D  increases  further.
Therefore, bankruptcy is impossible ifD < D*,
but the probability of bankruptcy increases for
increases in D when D >  D*. The probability
of bankruptcy  is the area under the p.d.f.  for
negative terminal  equity:
P(bankruptcy)
f(el)de  =  - ea _




To  illustrate  the  relationship  between  the
debt level,  the p.d.f.  of terminal  equity,  and
the probability  of bankruptcy,  let a =  -. 1,  b
=  .4,  k  = .1,  and  e,  =  $100,000.  For these
parameter values,  the expected  rate of return
on assets is  15%  and the debt level for which
terminal  equity  is  zero  if the  worst  possible
rate  of return  is  realized  is D* =  $450,000.
Figure  1  shows the p.d.f. of terminal equity for
debt levels of$0, $450,000, and $900,000. The
shaded area in the bottom panel represents the
probability of bankruptcy.
Since  the expected rate  of return  on assets
exceeds the cost of borrowing, the upper limit
of the p.d.f. of terminal equity increases with
debt.  The expected terminal equity level  is:
E(e)  = eo[l+  (a + b)/2]  + [(a + b)/2 - k]D.
Therefore,  expected  terminal  equity  also  in-
creases  with debt as long as the expected rate
of return on assets exceeds the borrowing rate.
Naturally the variance of terminal equity, V(e1)
= [(e0 +  D)(b - a)]2/12,  also  increases  with
debt.
Even though the uniform p.d.f. is simplistic,
it is a plausible  description  of subjective  be-
liefs,  and it captures  all of the main features
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of the leverage  choice  problem.  Expected ter-
minal equity increases with leverage capturing
the  well-known  multiplier  effect  of financial
leverage.  In addition,  risk increases  with lev-
erage,  both in the sense  of the variability of
the outcome and the likelihood of bankruptcy.
The remaining feature  of the leverage  choice
problem that must be considered  is the limi-
tation of liability produced  by the protection
of bankruptcy.
The possibility of seeking the protection of
bankruptcy  may be modeled  as a  truncation
of the p.d.f. of terminal  equity at zero  since a
bankruptcy generally has the effect of forgiving
any debt in  excess of the proprietor's  assets.
The probability  of bankruptcy  then becomes
a point mass in the distribution at a terminal
equity of zero. This splits the expected utility
integral into two parts: the probability of bank-
ruptcy times the utility of the equity resulting
from bankruptcy,  and the conditional  expect-
ed utility given bankruptcy does not occur:
E[u(e,)]
= f  u(O)f(el)de,  +  u(el)f(e,)de,
)P(bnkruptcy)+  u(e)f(e)de = u(O)P(bankruptcy) +  u(el)f(el)del.
Jo
For  analytical  convenience,  we  assume  the
utility function of terminal equity is negative
exponential,
u(e,) =  1 - exp(-ye,).
For this and any other utility function where
u(0) = 0,
E[u(e,)] = f  u(e,)f(e,)de,.
The  integration  for the  uniform p.d.f.,  how-
ever,  is complicated by the fact that when  D
< eO(l  + a)/(k - a) = D*, the lower endpoint
of the p.d.f.,  ea,  is positive.  For D >  D* the
expected utility of terminal equity is:
E[u(el)] =  o  u(el)f(e,)dej,
and for D < D* it becomes:
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E[u(e,)]
=.fm{  e~[1  - exp(--yel)]/(eb-  ea)del,
max{0,  ea}
where max{0,  ea} indicates that the lower limit
of integration  is ea  when  ea >  0  and  is zero
when  ea < 0.  This integration produces:
)  eb - max{O,  ea}
E[u(e)  eb-  ea eb - ea
+
exp(-ye)  - exp(-y max{0,  ea})
y(eb - ea)
The  expected utility  function has two  seg-
ments which can be defined in terms of ea or
D since  ea > 0 if and only if D < D*. Thus,
E[u(el)]
exp(-eb) - exp(-yea)  < D  D*
1+  y(eb -ea)  '
eb - [1  - exp(-ye)]  >  *
D > D",
(eb - ea)
The derivative  is also in two segments  but is
a continuous  function for D > 0:
dE [u(e,)]
dD
(eo  + D)yl(D) - y,(D)
(b  - a)(eo + D)
2
1 - 'eo(l  + k) - y2(D)
y(b - a)(eo + D)
2
where y,(D) = exp(-yea) - exp(-
denotes the derivative ofy, w.r.t. i
=  [1  +  y(b  - k)(eo  +  D)]exp(-7y
Results of the Model
Analysis  of the  model produces
that  pass  the  test  of casual  emi
strongly  conflict  with existing  m{
timal  leverage  choice.  It  is wide
edged that increasing financial lev(
effect  of increasing  both  expected
risk for the proprietor. Most econc
of behavior  under risk conclude
will choose to take more risk if ti
pensated  for  taking  this  risk  t
enough  additional  expected  retu
conventional  models  conclude
averse agent will not choose an art
amount of risk when  expected  cc
is finite. This model, however, sho
are threshold levels  of risk aversion,  and the
optimal behavior may change radically as the
threshold is crossed.
Specific results depend on an analysis of the
derivative  of expected  utility with respect to
debt.  Four propositions  about  the derivative
are formally  stated and proved in the appen-
dix. These four  propositions lead to the con-
clusion that the shape of expected  utility as a
function  of debt  depends  on  the  size  of the
relative  risk  aversion  parameter  (ye0)  and
whether the  debt  level  exceeds  D*,  the  debt
level at which  a bankruptcy  can  occur if the
worst possible outcome is realized for the rate
of return on assets. It is important to note that
even though the utility function of equity has
constant  absolute  risk aversion  (y),  behavior
is determined by the coefficient of relative risk
aversion (yeo).  Figure 2 shows examples of ex-
pected utility as a function of debt for the three
relevant cases:  yeo  >  1/(k - a), 1/(1  +  k) <
yeo <  1/(k  - a), and  yeo  <  1/(1  +  k).  These
three cases are examined in turn.
Optimal 100% Equity Financing
If the relative risk aversion parameter is "large"
o < D <  D*  [i.e.,  yeo  >  1/(k  - a)],  proposition  B  in the
appendix shows that expected utility decreases
for increases  in debt,  0  < D  < D*. Since  -1
D > D*,  < a < 0, however,  1/(k- a)> 1/(1  + k), and
proposition A shows that expected utility also
decreases with debt D  > D* if yeo  >  l/(k  -
-yne),  (D)  a). Therefore, if  e 0>  1/(k - a), the derivative
D,  and Y2 D)  of expected utility is always negative, and ex-
e
bJ)  pected utility is maximized  at zero debt.
The surprising thing is that this conclusion
stands even if the cost of borrowing is free and
the expected  rate of return on  risky assets  is
conclusions  arbitrarily  large.6 Therefore,  the  model  sug-
piricism  but  gests  that no  matter  how  high  the  potential
odels  of op-  return to leverage, there is a finite risk aversion
ly  acknowl-  parameter  that  will  cause  a  rational  choice
rage hasthe  maker  to  finance  with  100%  equity.  Even
I return  and  though this result  is theoretically  novel, any-
c mdels  one who deals with farmers knows  that non-
mctht  eole  borrowers  exist.  Indeed,  the data show [U.S.
ey ar  pcopm  Department  of Agriculture  (USDA)]  that, as iey are com-
)y  receiving
mn.  Further,
that  a  risk-
)itrarily large  6 For a given relative risk aversion parameter, whether a person
e  .n  *  falls on one side of the threshold or the  other depends on a and
)mpensatlon  k. In  other words, a  decline  in k may induce  a nonborrower to
ws that there  borrow.
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of 1 January  1989,  47.9% of U.S.  farms were
financed with  100% equity.7
Moderate Debt Choice
If the  coefficient  of relative  risk aversion  is
"moderate"  [i.e.,  1/(1  +  k)  <  yeo  <  1/(k  -
a)], the rational  choice  maker will  use  some
financial leverage but never enough to put the
farm in jeopardy of bankruptcy.  If yeo < l/(k
- a) and b is sufficiently large,  then proposi-
tion C  in the  appendix  shows  that expected
utility increases  with debt initially.  However,
proposition  A  shows that expected  utility is
negatively sloped for all debt levels that would
cause  bankruptcy  should  the  worst  possible
outcome occur (D > D*). Since expected util-
ity is increasing  at  the origin and  decreasing
for D >  D*, the Mean Value  Theorem guar-
antees  a  maximum  between  zero  and  D*.
Therefore,  for a relative risk aversion param-
eter between  1/(1  +  k) and  1/(k  - a), some
financial  leverage  will  be  chosen  but  never
enough to ruin the firm should the worst pos-
sible outcome  occur. Again,  the threshold  ef-
fect may be  observed.  Optimal debt will  not
exceed  D* even if the expected payoff of ad-
ditional  financial  leverage  is arbitrarily  large.
This  range of risk aversion  apparently  char-
acterizes  a  sizable  minority  of U.S.  farmers
who take advantage of credit to invest in prof-
itable  enterprises  but limit borrowing  to  the
9 1o  point  where  they are  confident  that  the firm
will  survive.  As of 1 January  1989,  38.5% of
U.S.  farms had  debt-asset ratios between  1%
and 40% (USDA). Some would argue that most
farms have a good chance  of survival with  a
debt level in this range.
The Case of Plunging
The final case is when the relative risk aversion
parameter is  "small"  [i.e.,  ye0 <  1/(1  +  k)]
7  A  reviewer correctly  pointed  out that this  may overstate  the
case because USDA data show year-end debt. Some of  these farms
may have had an operating loan for part of the year. In addition,
it is  clear that none of these "nonborrowers"  had an infinite  rate
of return on assets, so it must be emphasized that the empiricism
is causal  and is intended only to be illustrative.
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
debt ( x  $100,000  )
Figure 2.  The expected utility of terminal eq-
uity as a function of debt level  for a coefficient
of relative risk aversion greater than l/(k - a)
(top panel),  between  l/(k  +  1) and 1/(k  - a)
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Table 1.  Risk Aversion Parameters Consistent with Optimal Choice  of No Debt and Plunging
Behavior for Various  Utility and Probability Functions
Utility of Equitya
Distribution of Rate  Negative  Exponential  Power Distribution of Rate
of Return on Assets
b No debt  Plunging  No debt  Plunging
Uniform a = -0.5  b = 3.0  y = 0.01  y =  1 x  10-6  X = 0.01  X = 0.20
Normal  = 0.15 a = 0.15  y =  1 x  10-
4 y =  1 x  10-6  X = 0.10  X = 0.50
Gamma a= 10.0  = 0.06  '  = O.01c  7  =  1 x  10-6  X=  1  x  10-
6 X = 0.40
Beta a = 3.0 f  =  3.0  7y  = 
0 .10c  y =  1 x  10-
6 X =  1  x  10
-8 X = 0.50
a The power utility is given by u(e,) = (1 + X)ej.
b Probability density functions and parameter notation  are as given in Hogg and Craig.
c  Expected utility appears to be a nonincreasing function in debt as the decision maker becomes increasingly risk averse for small levels
of debt but decreases  rapidly as debt becomes large.  This may be due to the computer  restriction on the  number of significant digits
which are retained.  In any case, there would be no  strong motivation to use debt.
and  the  expected  rate  of return  on  assets  is
"large."  In this case,  proposition D in the ap-
pendix  shows  that expected  utility is  an  in-
creasing  function of wealth for the entire do-
main.  This  means  that  when  farmers  can
choose to borrow any amount up to their credit
limit at interest rate k, they will always borrow
to the limit, even if the limit is arbitrarily large.
Thus,  financial  plunging may be  the rational
choice  of a risk-averse  decision  maker when
investment opportunities are good and the rel-
ative risk  aversion  parameter  is  small.  This
behavior may also be observed in practice. As
of 1 January  1989, the data show that 4.4% of
U.S. farms  had debt-asset  ratios in excess of
70% (USDA).
The minimum level of b, the upper limit of
the distribution of the rate of return on assets,
that produces plunging behavior (b*) increases
with the agent's relative risk aversion param-
eter.  As  ye0 approaches  1/(1  +  k), an increas-
ingly large expected  rate of return is required
to  produce  plunging behavior.  As the  coeffi-
cient  of absolute  risk  aversion  (y) or  initial
equity  approaches  zero,  however,  b* ap-
proaches the value that is required to make the
expected rate of return on risky assets greater
than  the borrowing  rate.  Therefore,  given  a
coefficient  of absolute  risk aversion,  the like-
lihood of demanding infinite debt increases as
initial wealth becomes small.
Extensions  of the Results
The uniform distribution  and negative  expo-
nential utility function, which provide the ba-
sis for the results of  the previous section, imply
several  restrictive  conditions  about behavior
and  perception  of the  likelihood  of various
states of the world.  The negative exponential
utility implies constant absolute risk aversion.
The uniform  distribution  does  not allow for
the existence of a mode or for skewness in the
expected rate of return on assets.
We have shown, however, that the principal
results of the previous section do not depend
on either of these restrictive conditions by nu-
merically  evaluating  the  expected  utility  in-
tegral for a variety of combinations  of utility
functions and probability distributions.  In all
cases, reasonable sets of parameter values have
been found that produce expected utility func-
tions similar to those in figure  2. The specific
relationship between parameter values and op-
timal debt levels which produces the three kinds
of behavior  depends  on the functional  form.
No attempt was made to determine the thresh-
old levels of risk aversion to move from  case
to case. For an optimal debt choice of zero and
for plunging,  table  1 summarizes  the calcula-
tions for all combinations of the negative  ex-
ponential and power utility functions with nor-
mal,  gamma,  uniform,  and  beta  probability
distributions.  The gamma and beta distribu-
tions were  transformed to  allow for positive
probabilities of negative rates of return on as-
sets.8 For all calculations,  eo = $100,000  and
k = .10. Debt levels ranged from $0 to 50eo =
$5,000,000.  For purposes  of numerical  eval-
uation of expected utility integrals with infinite
upper limits of integration, the mean plus six
8 The  gamma distribution  was  defined  for  rates  of return  on
assets greater than -. 4 and the beta distribution was defined  for
rates from  -.3 to .7.
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standard deviations was used as the upper lim-
it for the normal  distribution  and  the mean
plus  10  standard  deviations  for the  gamma
distribution.
From  table  1, for the negative  exponential
utility function, the optimal choice of no debt
occurs for "large"  values of the risk aversion
parameter  while  plunging occurs  for "small"
values. The opposite is true for the power util-
ity function.  Risk aversion  can  be  measured
by  -u"(e 1)/u'(e1) or by -elu"(e)l/u'(e,). Using
either measure, increases  in the risk aversion
parameter  under  negative  exponential  utility
correspond  to  increased  risk  aversion.  For
power utility, the opposite is true, i.e., increas-
es in the risk aversion  parameter  correspond
to decreased  risk aversion.  Thus, the numer-
ical results in table  1 are consistent  with ac-
cepted theory.
For both the negative exponential and power
utility functions,  continuity of the derivative
of expected  utility  with respect  to debt  as  a
function of the risk aversion parameter, com-
bined with the Mean Value Theorem,  implies
that there exist risk aversion parameter values
between  those  for  the no  debt  and  plunging
situations  for  which  the  choice  of  a  finite
amount of debt would be optimal.  Thus,  the
major results of the previous  section also ap-
pear to be valid for constant relative risk aver-
sion and for unimodal symmetric and skewed
distributions.
suppose  eo  = $100,000.  This  means that  ye0
= 1 which is greater than  1/(1  +  k) - .91 and
a debt level between zero and D* = $450,000
is chosen, producing an optimal asset level of
between  $100,000 and $550,000.  If the worst
possible outcome  is realized,  terminal  equity
will be reduced by at least $10,000. This would
cause  'ye  for the next period  to be less than
.9.  This could, in turn, cause borrowing to in-
crease  to the limit in  the next period,  if the
expected rate of return on assets is sufficiently
large,  since  .9  <  1/(1  +  k).  Repeated  losses
guarantee  that plunging will occur eventually.
Similar examples  may be used to show the
effect of government  policies  that affect  agri-
cultural  interest  rates  and  the  risks  and  ex-
pected returns of farming. Although we did not
derive formal comparative static results for this
model,  numerical  examples  with  reasonable
parameter values may be used to illustrate the
Gabriel and Baker risk-balancing  hypothesis,
i.e.,  government  policies  that reduce the risk
of farming  will cause  the farmer  to use  more
leverage.  In addition,  the assertion by Feath-
erstone et al. that subsidized credit and income
support  policies  cause  increased  debt use  by
farmers and increased likelihood of failure may
also be supported  by this model.  Finally, the
Collins caveat about the effect of income sup-
port policies on optimal debt is also supported.
[Received December 1990; final revision
received May 1991.]
Conclusions
The  model  presented  here  supports  the  hy-
pothesis of Robison, Barry, and Burghardt that
financial  stress may  cause  radical  changes  in
borrowing  behavior.  Given  a  coefficient  of
constant  absolute  risk aversion  (y),  the coef-
ficient of relative  risk aversion  ('ye)  depends
entirely  on initial equity.  For negative  expo-
nential  utility and  a uniform probability  dis-
tribution,  equity losses due to an unfavorable
realization of rate of  return on assets may cause
the relative  risk aversion  parameter  to cross
the threshold  level  from  'yeo  >  1/(1  +  k) to
yeo  <  1/(1  +  k) and cause optimal borrowing
behavior  to  change  from  moderate  levels to
plunging.  For example, suppose a =  -. 1,  b =
.4, k = .1,  and y =  .00001.  For these param-
eters,  the expected  rate of return on assets  is
15%  and at a borrowing interest rate of 10%,
there is a positive return to leverage.  Further
References
Ahrendsen,  B.  L.,  and R.  N. Collender.  "Leverage  De-
cisions in the Presence of Bankruptcy Laws." Selected
paper, AAEA meetings, Baton Rouge LA, 1989. (Fac-
ulty Work. Pap. No. 150, Dep. Econ. and Bus., North
Carolina  State University,  1989).
Collins, R. A.  "Expected Utility, Debt-Equity Structure,
and Risk Balancing."  Amer.  J. Agr. Econ. 67(1985):
627-29.
Featherstone,  A. M.,  C. B. Moss, T. G.  Baker, and P. V.
Preckel.  "The  Theoretical  Effects  of Farm  Policies
on  Optimal  Leverage  and the  Probability of Equity
Losses."  Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 70(1988):572-79.
Gabriel,  S.  C., and C.  B.  Baker.  "Concepts  of Business
and  Financial  Risk."  Amer. J. Agr. Econ.  62(1980):
560-64.
Hogg,  R.  V.,  and A.  T.  Craig.  Introduction to Mathe-
matical  Statistics, 4th ed. New York: Macmillan Pub-
lishing Company,  1978.
Robison, L. J.,  P. J. Barry,  and W. G. Burghardt.  "Bor-
Collins and GburWestern Journal  ofAgricultural Economics
rowing  Behavior under Financial  Stress by the Pro-
prietary Firm:  A Theoretical Analysis."  West. J. Agr.
Econ.  12(1987):144-51.
Robison, L. J.,  and L. Lev.  "Distinguishing  between  In-
direct  and  Direct  Outcome  Variables  to  Predict
Choices under Risk or Why Woody Chip Went to the
Air." N. Cent. J. Agr. Econ. 8(1986):59-68.
U.S. Department of Agriculture,  Economic Research  Ser-
vice.  "Financial  Characteristics of U.S. Farms, Jan-
uary 1, 1989." Agriculture  Information Bulletin Num-
ber 579. Washington DC,  1989.
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions A-D
The following lemma is used to prove propositions A-D.
Its proof is straightforward  and has been omitted.
Lemma:  (i) E[u(el)] is a continuous
function of D for D >0.
(ii) 0  < E[u(e,)] <  1 for D  - 0.
(iii) lim E[u(el)]  =E  = (b - k)/(b - a) < 1.
D-oo
(iv)  E[u(] exists and is continuous
dD
for D > 0.
Proposition  A:  If yeo 
> 1/(1  + k),
then  l)]  < 0 for D  > D*.
dD
Proof:
If D > D*, the derivative of expected utility w.r.t. debt
is negative if  1  - ye,(l  +  k) - y2(D) <  0.  If  ye0 >  1/(1
+ k),  then  1 - yeo(l  +  k)  <  0.  Since y2(D) is  strictly
positive, expected utility  is a strictly decreasing  function
ofD for D  > D* if  ye0  1/(1  + k)..
Proposition  B:  If yeo  >  1/(k - a),
dE [u(e,)] then dE [u(el)] <  0 for O -<  D  < D*.
dD
Proof:
For 0  <  D  < D*, the derivative is negative if and only
if (eo + D)y  (D) - yl(D) > 0, or equivalently, if and only
if [1  +  y(eo  + D)(b - k)]exp(-yeb)  -[1  - (eO  + D)(k
- a)]exp(-,ea)  >  0.  A sufficient  condition  for the  last
inequality is that [1  +  y(eO  + D)(b - k)]exp(-yeb)  - [1
- 7yeo(k  - a)]exp(-yea) > 0 since D >  0. Since  yeo  >  1/
(k - a),  1 - yeo(k - a) < 0 and the left-hand side of the
preceding inequality  is the  sum of a positive  and a non-
negative  term.  Therefore,  expected  utility  is also  a  de-
creasing  function of D, 0  < D  < D*, if yeo > l/(k - a).
Proposition  C:  If yeo  <  1/(k  - a) and b is "large,"
dE [u(e,)] then d  [u(e.)] > 0 for D = 0.
dD
Proof:
For  D  =  0,  the  derivative  is  positive  if and  only if
eo 0y(0) - y1(0) < O. But eoy(O0) - y,(O) =  [1  +  yeo(b -
k)]exp[-yeo(l  + b)] - [1  +  yeo(a - k)lexp[-ryeo(l  + a)].
Since  yre  <  1/(k  - a), the  second  term  is positive.  By
application  of l'H6pital's Rule,  lim[l  +  yeo(b  - k)]exp
b-.o
[-yeo(l + b)] = 0. Hence, for b sufficiently large, the first
term  will  be smaller  than the second  and the  difference
will be negative. Therefore, the derivative will be positive
and expected  utility will be increasing  at D = 0..
Proposition  D:  If ye,  <  1/(1  + k) and b is "large,"
then  [()  > O  for D - 0.
dD
Proof:  The domain is considered in two  sections,  0  < D  <
D*  and  D >  D*.  First, for  0  < D  < D*,  the derivative  is
positive if and only if  (eO  + D)y'(D) - yI(D) <  O.However,
(eO  + D)y\(D) - y(D)
= y2(D)  - [1  - y(eo  + D)(k - a)]exp(-yea)
< y2(D) - [1  - y(eo + D*)(k - a)]exp [-yeo(l + a)]
=y2(D)-  [1  - yeo(l + k)]exp[-^ye(l  + a)].
Since  yeo  <  1/(1  + k),  [1  - yeo(l  + k)]exp [-yeo(l + k)]
is  always  positive.  By  application  of  l'H6pital's  rule,
lim[y2(D)] = 0. Hence, y2(D) may be made arbitrarily small
b-oo
by  the  selection  of a large  b  and the  derivative  will be
positive.
For D > D*, the derivative  is positive  if 1 - yeo(l  +
k) - y2(D) is positive. Again, by the application ofl'H6pi-
tal's Rule, lim [y2(D)]  =  0 so that the derivative  will be
b-.
positive if b is sufficiently large.-
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